**Title I Finance Negative**

**Case – Inequality**

**AT: Inequality – Alt Causes**

**Alternative cause - Intergenerational mobility locks in inequality; it creates obstacles for black and Hispanic families in the long term**

**Tasch 15 (Barbara is a reporter for Business Insider UK, “Troubling new study explains one big reason for inequality in America”,** [**http://www.businessinsider.com/new-study-provides-an-excellent-explanation-for-inequality-in-america-2015-6**](http://www.businessinsider.com/new-study-provides-an-excellent-explanation-for-inequality-in-america-2015-6)**, LD)**

**Black and Hispanic families have a disadvantage compared with white and Asian families. Not only do they earn less on average, but those who earn the same amount do not have access to the same neighborhoods. That means they don't profit from the perks of richer neighborhoods such as good schools and less violence. A Harvard University** [**study on the impact of neighborhoods on intergenerational mobility**](http://www.equality-of-opportunity.org/images/nbhds_exec_summary.pdf) **looked at the records of over 5 million children and showed that the neighborhood children grew up in played an important role in their long-term success. The study also found that counties with higher rates of upward mobility often shared five characteristics: "they have less segregation by income and race, lower levels of income inequality, better schools, lower rates of violent crime, and a larger share of two-parent households," the study reported. It also pointed out that areas with a larger African-American population often have lower upward-mobility rates, which in turn affect racial inequality over generations. Another Harvard University** [**study, which looks at the effects that better neighborhoods have on children**](http://www.equality-of-opportunity.org/images/mto_exec_summary.pdf) **through the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment, showed that children growing up in nicer neighborhoods had a much better chance of having a higher earning potential later in life. The study found that moving a young child from public housing to a low-poverty area through the MTO experiment increases a child's total lifetime earning by about $302,000.**

**Wealth Concentration is an alt cause to inequality; the top 1% controls a large portion of the wealth share which causes a snowball effect**

**Saez & Zucman 16 (Emmanuel Saez is a French and American economist who is Professor of Economics at the University of California at Berkeley, Gabriel Zucman is a French economist. Since 2015 Zucman has been working as an assistant professor of economics at the University of California at Berkeley, “WEALTH INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1913: EVIDENCE FROM CAPITALIZED INCOME TAX DATA”, VOL. 131, Issue 2, May 2016, Page 523, LD)**

**The analysis of the distribution of household wealth since 1913 yields two main findings. First, wealth inequality is making a comeback. In 2012, the wealth share of the top 0.1% was three times higher than in 1978, and almost as high as in the 1916 and 1929 historical peaks. The key driver of the rapid increase in wealth at the top is the upsurge of top incomes. Income inequality has a snowballing effect on wealth distribution. Top incomes are being saved at high rates, pushing wealth concentration up; in turn, rising wealth inequality leads to rising capital income concentration, which contributes to further increasing top income and wealth shares. Our core finding is that this snowballing effect has been sufficiently powerful to dramatically affect the shape of the US wealth distribution over the last 30 years. We also find that today’s rich are younger than half a century ago and have much more labor income, but due to data limitations we cannot yet provide formal decompositions of the relative importance of self-made vs. dynastic wealth, and we hope our results will motivate further research in this area. The second key result involves the dynamics of the bottom 90% wealth share. There is a widespread view that a key structural change in the US economy since the beginning of the twentieth century has been the rise of middle-class wealth, in particular because of the rise of pensions and home ownership rates. And indeed our results show that the wealth share of the bottom 90% gradually increased from 20% in the 1920s to a high of 35% in the mid-1980s. But in a sharp reversal of past trends, the wealth share of the bottom 90% has fallen since then, to about 23% in 2012. Pension wealth has continued to increase but not enough to compensate for a surge in mortgage, consumer credit, and student debt. The key driver of the declining wealth share of the bottom 90% is plummeting middle-class savings. This fall may owe to the low growth of middle-class income, to financial deregulation leading to some forms of predatory lending, or to growing behavioral biases in the saving decisions of the middleclass.**

**Case – Solvency**

**Title I Fails – Test Scores**

**Title I funds don't reduce the achievement gap and worsen test results**

**Weinsten, Steifel, Swchartz, and Chalico 9 (Meryle G. Weinstein, Ph.D.**

**Research Scientist and Assistant Director,Institute for Education and Social Policy, Leanna Stiefel Professor of Economics and of Education Policy, Wagner and Steinhardt Schools, Amy Ellen Schwartz Professor of Economics, Education and Public Policy Director, Institute for Education and Social Policy Wagner and Steinhardt Schools, Luis Chalico, Ph.D. Candidate, Wagner School, “Does Title I Increase Spending and Improve Performance?”,** [**http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/scmsAdmin/uploads/003/949/WP%20%2309-09.pdf**](http://steinhardt.nyu.edu/scmsAdmin/uploads/003/949/WP%20%2309-09.pdf)**, page 23-24, Steindhart University)**

**Additional amounts of funds that Title I schools receive, compared to non-Title I schools, seem not to narrow the achievement gaps between poor student and their more advantaged peers and may even reduce school wide average test scores somewhat in elementary and middle 23 schools. These effects for both spending and scores seem to increase the longer schools are Title I and to be stronger for ones that are always Title I versus ones that go in and out of eligibility. These findings are important and they also lead to several hypotheses that need to be tested in order to understand why they occur. The results in the RD estimations indicate the local average treatment effect, or what is happening right around the cutoff, but we do not know how the schools near the cutoffs are serving the Title I students. There are informal reports that a common use of Title I funds is to hire extra personnel to tutor students who are lagging. But this tutoring could remove the students from their regular classroom causing them to miss material or be stigmatized or both.**

**Title I Fails – Bureaucracy**

**Title I grants fail – excessive bureaucracy**

**McShane 17 McShane, Michael Q., and Frederick M. Hess. "DeVos Should Take on Education's Reformocracy." National Review. National Review, 22 June 2017. Web. 29 June 2017. <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/448845/besty-devos-education-reform-mandate-take-bureaucratic-establishment>.**

**It’s time to reboot reform and rediscover the conviction that bureaucracy and paperwork are not tools for fostering terrific schools. We need to recognize that timid teachers and compliance-focused administrators are not going to create the environment in which our students can thrive. Secretary DeVos should lead this charge. It is consistent with her vision, and it offers her a chance to address the concerns of educators and district leaders who feel both frustrated with reformocrats and neglected by her single-minded focus on school choice. Here’s how: Take a hard look at strings attached to Title I dollars. Title I provides the aid to low-income students that is the federal government’s single largest K–12 budgetary expense. It touches most schools and school systems, hindering decisions about how to spend local dollars and staff schools. Even esoteric-seeming language governing the reporting of such things as “maintenance of effort” and “time and effort” can mean that schools wind up hiring staff they don’t need, assign kids to ineffectual programs just to satisfy their auditors, or spend thousands of hours managing paperwork instead of planning lessons and teaching. The first order of business for DeVos ought to be holding a series of public hearings where teachers and administrators can explain how such requirements play out in practice, documenting the challenges they face and generating recommendations for how to more constructively use Title I funds. Examine the unwieldy requirements of federal grants. The Department of Education provides grants to colleges and universities, local education agencies, state education agencies, and nonprofit organizations. To describe the bureaucratic red tape that accompanies these grants as Kafkaesque is to insult Kafka. Some of the problem is due to strictures in the statutes authorizing the grant programs, but the secretary has latitude to define what she sees as appropriate evidence that a state is going to live up to its promises. Today, that frequently takes the form of a 50-page narrative that is a salad of buzzwords and big claims. DeVos could convene district leaders, state leaders, nonprofit representatives, and researchers to rethink the federal grant-application process so that successful applications can provide the evidence the department needs without the flowery padding.**

**Title I Fails – States Misuse $**

**Title I fails – states misuse federal money**

**Stadler 17 (New Study Finds States Fail to Deliver on Title I Promise of Extra Funding for Low-Income Students, by Zahava Stadler | Zahava holds master’s degrees in public administration and education policy from the University of Pennsylvania and a bachelor’s degree in politics from Princeton University and contributes to policy research, analysis and communications at EdBuild | The 74 31 May 2017,** [**https://www.the74million.org/article/new-study-finds-states-fail-to-deliver-on-title-i-promise-of-extra-funding-for-low-income-students**](https://www.the74million.org/article/new-study-finds-states-fail-to-deliver-on-title-i-promise-of-extra-funding-for-low-income-students)**)**

**A long line of** [**research**](https://www.the74million.org/article/new-research-states-that-chose-or-were-forced-to-spend-more-money-on-poor-schools-saw-student-gains) **teaches that students in poverty can achieve at higher levels when they’re supported with greater education funding. In theory, low-income students should be getting this greater funding in every state. That’s because the federal government provides extra dollars for high-poverty schools and districts through the** [**Title I program**](https://www2.ed.gov/programs/titleiparta/index.html?exp=0) **and specifies in law that this money must “supplement, not supplant” state and local dollars — that is, states can’t use the federal money to offset what they would otherwise give to high-poverty districts. Every state receives Title I money. For that money to do its job lifting up low-income students, every state would need to provide its poorer districts with, at the very least, funding equal to what wealthier districts have. Only then could Title I serve as icing on the cake, as intended. In reality, though, a new analysis by EdBuild finds that the highest-poverty school districts in most states have less state and local funding than those serving the fewest students in poverty. Falling short of equity — and federal expectations: Why isn’t the Title I mandate doing its job? Late last year, the outgoing administration tried to back the “supplement, not supplant” rule with a** [**regulation**](https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=ED-2016-OESE-0056-0001) **that would have required districts to spend at least as much per pupil in Title I schools as they do in other schools. But states** [**pushed**](https://edsource.org/2016/state-leaders-join-gop-critics-of-draft-federal-funding-rules-essa/572365) [**back**](http://www.ccsso.org/News_and_Events/Press_Releases/CCSSO_Releases_Statement_on_Proposed_Regulations_.html) [**hard**](http://www.educationworld.com/a_news/state-education-commissioner-calls-%E2%80%98supplement-not-supplant%E2%80%99-regulation-%E2%80%98extreme-paperwork) [**against**](http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2015-2016/resolutionadopted/Senate/htm/2016-SAR-0214.htm) **the proposed rule, and it was** [**withdrawn**](http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2017/01/essa_john_b_king_jr_withdraws_.html)**, leaving it up to the states to ensure funding equity. As the numbers show, they’re falling short. In 2014, 27 states saw less money per pupil in their highest-poverty districts. For example, per-pupil funding in the highest-poverty school districts in Arizona was about $1,100 less than in the state’s least-poor districts, a 13 percent gap. Similarly, in California, the highest-poverty districts had close to $900 less per student than the lowest-poverty ones. Meanwhile, Arizona received almost $330 million in Title I dollars this year, and California got over $1.76 billion. Even more galling, both states received money through the Education Finance Incentive Grant Program,** [**a subset of Title I**](https://www2.ed.gov/programs/titleiparta/index.html?exp=0) **that is meant to reward states for progressive funding allocations. Much of that money will have to be used to make up the deficits left by state and local underfunding of poor districts, not to give low-income students a boost — exactly the opposite of Congress’s intention. The road to inequity is paved with good intention: Many states even fall short of their own policy goals for funding equity. It’s true that in some states, there’s no effort to provide more for low-income students. But in most cases, when a state determines how much funding each district needs,** [**the calculation is increased**](https://medium.com/edbuild/funding-for-students-in-poverty-must-be-a-priority-5af726a185dc) **for children in poverty. For example,** [**in Louisiana**](https://www.louisianabelieves.com/docs/default-source/minimum-foundation-program/2014-15-circular-no-1156-senate-concurrent-resolution-55.pdf)**, each student generates about $4,000 for her district. But the count of each district’s low-income students is boosted by 22 percent for funding purposes, so a Louisiana district serving all low-income students should have 22 percent more funding than the standard, or a little over $4,800 per student. That’s not how the numbers work out, though: The state’s highest-poverty districts actually have $236 less per student on average than the lowest-poverty districts. Why does Louisiana, like many states that are trying to provide more for students in poverty, fall short? The state falls prey to a common problem: Its state funding formula allocates more money for high-poverty school systems, but wealthier districts can afford to collect extra money from supplemental property taxes — and there’s no state rule limiting how much they can raise. The bonus taxes paid in those richer districts swamp the money that the state is paying poorer communities, and the result is a lopsided system in which the neediest end up with less. When states fail to provide: When states fail to achieve equal state and local funding for high- and low-poverty districts, Title I money ceases to be “supplemental.” Instead, it is effectively used to fill the gap, not to give students in poverty the added support that Congress intended. So when all the funding comes together — state, local, and federal dollars — low-income students don’t get the greater resources they need. To properly provide for students in poverty, states need to think about progressive funding from all sides. Funding formulas must consider the cost of educating low-income students when calculating necessary funding, so high-poverty districts are entitled to more state money. On the local side, states should make sure that richer districts can’t raise so much extra funding that their budgets dwarf those of low-wealth school systems. And when it comes to federal dollars, states have to be responsible stewards of Title I money. Those dollars are meant to give low-income students a boost. It’s the state’s obligation to make sure they get one.**

**Title I Fails – Equity**

**Title I fails to meet the equal protection and only serves to undermine equality**

**Black 10 (Derek W. Black is an Associate Professor and Director of the Education Rights Center, Howard University School of Law, “THE CONGRESSIONAL FAILURE TO ENFORCE EQUAL PROTECTION THROUGH THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT”,** [**http://www.bu.edu/law/journals-archive/bulr/documents/black.pdf**](http://www.bu.edu/law/journals-archive/bulr/documents/black.pdf)**, page 5-6, Vol. 90:313, Boston University Law Review, LD)**

**The question of whether Congress has a duty is the more complicated of the two. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees citizens equal protection of the laws, but it also grants Congress the power to enforce equal protection.21 This grant of power gives Congress the authority to address school inequalities, but whether this grant of power obligates Congress to address inequalities is less certain. Viewed independently, the language of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests that Congress’s enforcement power includes a significant amount of discretion.22 But the basic language and nature of Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment powers are distinct from that of other constitutional powers that are inherently and entirely discretionary.23 These distinctions suggest that Congress’s discretion under the Fourteenth Amendment, unlike other powers, is not unlimited. Further comparison and analysis suggest that Congress is obligated to act in the face of known equal protection violations, but has wide discretion in how it acts. Yet even if Congress has no obligation to act, reason dictates that any action that Congress voluntarily takes must be consistent with the Amendment’s equal protection guarantee. Since Congress, in enacting Title I, has already entered the field of education, identifying a preexisting duty to remedy inequality becomes less important. Congress now must ensure that Title I furthers, rather than undermines, equal protection. As currently enacted, Title I fails to satisfy this requirement. Even worse, Title I actually sanctions, undermines, and exacerbates educational inequalities in several respects. First, the Title I funding formulas rely on irrational factors to distribute funds. As a result, they randomly and disproportionately drive resources to some school districts and deprive other districts, which undermines both equity and the goal of meeting student needs.24 For instance, the formulas guarantee a certain level of funding to small states regardless of the number of poor students who live there.25 Because these small states tend to have smaller percentages of poor students, they receive more Title I funds per pupil than many other states with higher levels of poverty.26 The formulas also increase the funding per pupil as the size of the district grows, advantaging large school districts over small districts.27 However, the size of a school district does not correlate with geographic costs or the percentage of poor students therein.28 In addition, although the formulas exponentially increase the Title I funds per pupil as the percentage of poor students in a school district approaches thirty, the formulas stop exponentially increasing funds beyond that point.29 Yet student need continues to increase, if not skyrocket, as the percentage of poor students rises above thirty percent.30 Finally, the formulas allot money based on each state’s per-pupil expenditure on education.31 As a result, the richest states receive the most Title I dollars and the poorest states receive the fewest. In all fairness, richer states generally have higher locality costs as well, but these states do not uniformly have significant levels of poor students whereas poor states more often do.32 In short, these funding formula flaws provide fewer funds to the schools and students who need the funds most, forcing them to make their Title I dollars stretch further than other schools. In this respect, rather than narrowing inequities, Title I expands them. It takes money and resources that poor students and schools need and delivers them elsewhere.**

**Title I Fails – Rollback**

**Trump will rollback Title I programs anyway – he plans to reallocate funding to support his school choice agenda**

**Kyra Gurney 17 is an education reporter for the Miami Herald, with a degree in Journalism from Columbia University, “6 big ways Trump presidency could change schools”, Miami Herald, November 12 2017, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/education/article114225223.html/ SC**

**Donald Trump has provided only scant details on his education agenda but the ideas he has pitched make one thing certain: the president-elect’s vision for American schools is very different from that of his predecessor.**

**While proponents of school choice are invigorated by the prospect of presidential support, teachers unions and other organizations are concerned that Trump’s administration will take money away from struggling public schools. American Federation of Teachers president Randi Weingarten believes Trump could bankroll his $20 billion school choice plan at the expense of Title I funds, which are federal dollars for low-income public schools, or from funding that helps low-income students pay for college, because those are the biggest pots of money. “If he moves forward with that proposal it’s the decimation of public schools,” Weingarten said. In an urban school district like Miami-Dade, a loss or a significant change in the distribution of Title I funding would have a huge impact on high-needs schools.  “It would be completely detrimental to us and we would be one of the hardest-hit counties because about 70 percent of our population qualifies for Title I,” United Teachers of Dade President Karla Hernandez-Mats said.**

**Portability CP**

**1NC – Portability CP**

**Counterplan Text: The United States federal government should allocate all current and proposed Title I funding for impoverished schools on a per-pupil basis and require that funds follow students to the school of their choice.**

**Counterplan solves – allows schools to more efficiently spend money to help poor students on a schoolwide, instead of districtwide, basis.**

**Furtick and Snell 2014 (Katie and Lisa “Federal school finance reform: Moving toward Title I funding following the child”. *Los Angeles: Reason Foundation. Retrieved October*, *15*, p.2014 http://reason.org/files/federal\_school\_finance\_reform.pdf)**

**The best way to solve the problems inherent in the current system of Title I funding is to make Title I funds portable—in other words, allocate funds on a per-pupil basis and require that funds follow pupils to the school of their choice. There are a number of advantages to such a system: First, allocating Title I funds on a per-pupil basis rather than through the existing, stringent funding mechanism simply and clearly ties the funding to the child in need, which is where it is supposed to go. Moreover, attaching extra funding to individual, disadvantaged students gives schools an incentive to attract and retain such students (and the funding that goes with them). This will encourage schools to compete to come up with the best ways to serve disadvantaged students, leading to more innovation and better educational outcomes. Furthermore, this would facilitate the national trend toward families being able to choose the schools their children attend because the child would bring the funding with him. Second, principals should be given both the professional freedom and the incentive to raise low-income students’ achievement. Currently, restrictions like supplement-not-supplant attempt to tightly control principals’ and districts’ use of Title I funds, with significant administrative burdens of management and enforcement. Instead of managing the process by which funding is used, principals could be given greater freedom in how they use that funding, in return for delivering higher achievement scores among the targeted student population. When school principals have greater autonomy over how Title I funds are spent, they can use innovative and flexible approaches that serve their particular students’ needs, allowing them to more fully perform the role of school leader. The flip-side of greater financial autonomy is that principals should be more directly held accountable for student outcomes. Judging a principal by students’ academic outcomes assigns responsibility where it is due, and greater autonomy over use of funding to achieve those outcomes confers the authority to foster those achievements. This decentralized approach promotes better results than a one-size-fits-all model. Findings from Reason Foundation’s 2013 edition of the Weighted Student Formula Yearbook suggest that in school districts that use a portable school funding framework to finance schools, more school-level autonomy over school budgets leads to faster improvement in student achievement and a greater likelihood of closing achievement gaps.27 When principals are given more autonomy over their funding, administrative burdens decrease and are redirected toward measurement of academic progress, which serves the goal of Title I funding directly. Not having to justify expenditures through the labyrinthine cost-by-cost test mandated by the supplement-not-supplant provision also rectifies a variety of funding inequities. For example, it eliminates the “pull-out” models that segregate Title I from nonTitle I students, reducing administrative strain and fostering student unity. Title I funds could be used for a wider and more varied range of comprehensive and innovative programs if they were no longer limited by the restrictive confines of achieving supplementation and avoiding supplanting. In addition, Title I funds would be spent more effectively in the absence of supplement-not-supplant rules because schools and districts would no longer be locked into spending decisions from previous years. Furthermore, allocating funds to individual students would eliminate the need to uphold the comparability requirement, and replace it with more transparent financial arrangements. Instead of allowing districts to submit vague reports of comparability where dollar amounts are disguised by uniform staffing levels or ratios, money would follow each individual student to his or her respective school, increasing real equity between per-pupil expenditures from state and local sources at Title I schools and non-Title I schools.**

**2NC Solvency – Portability**

**Portable Funding solves better; it allows for more flexible funding which results in greater achievement for low income students**

**Koteskey 15 (Tyler Koteskey is a policy analyst at the Reason Foundation and Young Voices Advocate., 9 July 2015, Education Policy Analyst researches school finance reform and portable student funding. “Title I funding portability is key to ESEA reform”** [**http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/education/247300-title-i-funding-portability-is-key-to-esea-reform**](http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/education/247300-title-i-funding-portability-is-key-to-esea-reform)**,LD)**

**Examining what schools have to go through to get Title I funding, it is easy to see why. The program’s litany of regulations forces the administrative staff of states and districts to spend resources proving compliance with requirements on how they spend their grants to avoid losing eligibility. This wastes time and money that could be used to allocate the funding in ways that best serves their schools’ individual needs. The “supplement not supplant” and “comparability” provisions, discussed at length in the Reason Foundation’s** [**Title I reform analysis**](http://reason.org/news/show/federal-school-finance-reform)**, restricts states’ abilities to combine these dollars with pre-existing state funding for low-income students to create comprehensive programs. And because Title I allocates grants to schools rather than individual students, it actually promotes per-student funding inequalities between schools, especially at larger schools with high numbers but low-percentages of low-income kids.  Scott’s Title I portability amendment has the potential to change all of this. Tying Title I funds to eligible students relieves administrative burdens by removing the need to justify expenditures. It also ensures that every school gets the same amount of per-student grants for every low-income child they educate. By making these funds portable, wherever these students enroll, low-income pupils will be able to expand their educational options. They will benefit from administrators with new incentives to attract and retain them to get access to the dollars they bring. Portable Title I funding could even be combined with expanding state voucher, tax-credit scholarship programs, and education savings accounts, with** [**proven**](http://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/disadv/nati.pdf) [**positive**](http://www.edchoice.org/Research/Reports/A-Win-Win-Solution--The-Empirical-Evidence-on-School-Choice.aspx) [**effects**](http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/08/23-school-vouchers-harvard-chingos) **on achievement for disadvantaged students to give even more families access to better options.**

**Portability outweighs Title One approach to academic achievement**

**Kahlenberg 15 (Richard Kahlenberg is a senior fellow at The Century Foundation and author of The Remedy: Class, Race, and Affirmative Action, “Saving School Choice Without Undermining Poor Communities”,** [**https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/02/saving-school-choice-without-undermining-poor-communities/385510/**](https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/02/saving-school-choice-without-undermining-poor-communities/385510/)**, The Atlantic, LD)**

**Research from Montgomery County, Maryland, and elsewhere suggests that reducing socioeconomic isolation is a far more effective—and cheaper—way of improving academic achievement than spending extra money on high-poverty schools. In a 2010 Century Foundation report, Heather Schwartz, a researcher at the RAND Corporation, compared the effect of two separate programs in Montgomery County. Montgomery’s school-based program, following the traditional Title I logic, provided extra money—approximately $2,000 per pupil—to students in high-poverty schools that was aimed at reducing class sizes in the early grades, expanding professional-development opportunities for teachers, and establishing extended learning time. The second program, an inclusionary-zoning housing policy, allowed low-income families to live in public housing in middle-class neighborhoods and send their children to low-poverty schools. Because families were randomly assigned to public-housing units throughout the county, Schwartz was able to fairly compare which students performed better over time: those in higher-poverty schools that received extra funding, or those in lower-poverty schools receiving lower levels of funding. Schwartz tracked students and found that those randomly assigned to middle-class neighborhoods and schools performed far better, cutting the math achievement gap with middle-class students in half. Being allowed to attend middle-class schools—where national research suggests that, on average, students are more academically engaged, parents are more involved in school affairs, and teachers have higher expectations—trumped the Title I approach. In other words, the extra funding doesn’t necessarily compensate for the disadvantages of attending high-poverty schools. Those findings would suggest that the Republicans’ principle of portability, in fact, has in it the seeds of a solution to reduce economic segregation through public-school choice—if, and only if, portability is properly structured. In order to accomplish this, portable federal Title I funding, as well as state and local funding, would need to be weighted heavily enough to give poor kids sufficient money in their "backpacks" that middle-class public schools would want to recruit them to attend.**

**Title 1 portability can decrease income inequality.**

**Snow 17 Snow, McKenzie. "It's Time to Free States to Improve the Focus and Fit of Their Title I Funds." EdExcellence. The Thomas B. Fordham Institute, 24 Jan. 2017. Web. 29 June 2017. <https://edexcellence.net/articles/its-time-to-free-states-to-improve-the-focus-and-fit-of-their-title-i-funds>.**

**Unfortunately, for years, we’ve all heard the same arguments about why Title I portability can’t be done—or wouldn’t be worth the trouble even if it could. Below, I’ve responded to four of these perennial questions. The goal is to convince readers to give Title I portability a second look—with the hope that states can be free to try and do better for their low-income students. 1. Will portable grants be enough money to make a difference for individual private school students? An appropriately constructed portable grant program could make a significant impact on individual students, especially in states with robust private school choice ecosystems. The national average Title I grant is about $600 per student served. If, instead, states and districts were to serve only students meeting a poverty income level eligibility standard ($24,300 for a family of four), the national average Title I grant per eligible student would more than double to nearly $1,400. If used with an existing tax credit or state-funded scholarship, the private school options a disadvantaged student could access would greatly expand. (For context, NCES reports that the average tuition for Catholic elementary schools, the lowest average for private school tuition, was $5,330. The average scholarship provided by means-tested voucher programs in Indiana, North Carolina, and Ohio is about $4,000.) A federal grant of $1,400 per year could also have a significant impact on a student remaining within the public school system, providing an estimated seventy-five hours of tutoring, or two hours of tutoring per week for the entire school year. 2. Won’t Title I portability open private schools and providers to federal regulations, and what about academic accountability? Portable Title I grants to private school students should be parent-directed accounts that are considered assistance to the child, not assistance to the private school or provider. Private providers would not directly receive federal funds and, thus, would not incur unnecessary regulations that may interfere with the independence and unique mission of a private school. However, that’s not to say that private schools serving Title I students would be free from accountability. Rather, ExcelinEd believes that all schools receiving public dollars should be subject to a range of policies that appropriately balance accountability with the autonomy essential to private schooling. For example, states designing portable grants should decide the range of schools and programs at which students may use their parent-directed Title I account (perhaps accredited schools or licensed providers), and ensure that parents only spend funds on state-approved educational expenses. In addition, ExcelinEd supports Title I portability legislative proposals (like the Scholarships for Kids Act sponsored by Chairman Alexander of the U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions) that would require that participating educational providers administer a state-approved test and report on results. Such academic accountability requirements work well with what many existing state-run private school choice programs require, and portable grants to private school students would be most impactful if disbursed in tandem with these programs. Florida’s tax-credit scholarship program, for example, which serves more than ninety-seven thousand of the state’s low-income students, requires that private schools administer their choice of a norm reference test or the state assessment. Results are reported to an independent evaluator (Learning Systems Institute at Florida State University), which issues a public report on the academic achievement of participating students. 3. Must schools prove that they are spending the Title I money on the children who generate the funds? For public schools serving Title I students, no policy change is recommended. Currently, about 94 percent of all Title I participants are served in “schoolwide programs,” meaning that Title I funds may be used to serve all students in the school (not just Title I participants). And, under the Every Student Succeeds Act, a state can choose to treat all their Title I schools as schoolwide programs. Public schools receiving Title I funds under a portable system should not have to prove funds were spent on certain students either. For nonpublic students, a similar approach is recommended. Nonpublic students participating in Title I could receive parent-directed accounts to pay for state-approved educational expenses (such as private school tuition, tutoring, online learning program fees, testing fees, textbooks and curriculum). If a parent chose to direct funds toward private school tuition, the receiving private school would not have to show it was providing the student with supplemental services because the Title I funds were very clearly spent on the participating student—in the form of private school tuition. 4. Wouldn’t Title I portability drain money from our poor, urban schools? Title I is currently focused on funding a system of schools, not disadvantaged students. A portability option would allow states to instead fund eligible children—putting students first in a very real way. Furthermore, arguing against any voluntary change to the status quo assumes that current Title I funding distribution is fair. Unfortunately, this is not the case. We’ve been hearing a lot about Michigan’s education system recently. Under the current Title I funding distribution system, Detroit City School District receives about $4,100 per child. The School District of the City of Inkster—less than thirty minutes away from downtown Detroit and with essentially the same poverty rate—receives about $1,350 per child or one-third of Detroit’s per pupil allocation. Because of the Title I distribution required by four competing federal formulas—each of which has different allocation patterns, prioritizes different states and localities, and is meant to create different incentives—the per pupil allocation between different states and districts seems erratic. In addition to considering the integrity of Title I’s current funding distribution, it is important to take a sober look at the likely rate of student transfers in a portable system. The transfer rates in states with public and private school choice programs are gradual, and Title I-eligible students – and, therefore, Title I dollars—would not likely depart any school or district overnight. To limit the impact of transitioning to portability on dependent schools, states could include weights for concentrations of poverty, allotting more Title I dollars to students in attendance areas with poverty rates above a certain threshold. States also could have the option to include hold harmless provisions based on poverty concentration that limit the amount of federal dollars a school or district could lose each year. However, such hold harmless provisions could complicate and curb the extent to which funds truly follow the child in a state’s portable Title I program. Clearly, the current Title I funding distribution system isn’t perfectly fair or impressively impactful. Allowing states to design and implement transparent, student-centered Title I distribution systems that better reflect their unique education landscapes does more than shift money around. Portability empowers states to target resources so that Title I funding can have a meaningful impact on their neediest students. Simply put, Title I portability would provide states the freedom to try to serve their low-income students with existing federal dollars better—if they want.**

**The utilization of Title 1 Portability leads to greater academic achievement from low income youth, which in turn close the achievement gap between students. This would also better future innovation.**

**Snell and Furtick 14 Snell, Lisa, and Katie Furtick. "Federal School Finance Reform: Moving Toward Title 1 Funding Following the Child." (n.d.): n. pag. Sept. 2014. Web. 29 June 2017. <http://reason.org/files/federal\_school\_finance\_reform.pdf>.**

**The best way to solve the problems inherent in the current system of Title I funding is to make Title I funds portable—in other words, allocate funds on a per-pupil basis and require that funds follow pupils to the school of their choice. There are a number of advantages to such a system: First, allocating Title I funds on a per-pupil basis rather than through the existing, stringent funding mechanism simply and clearly ties the funding to the child in need, which is where it is supposed to go. Moreover, attaching extra funding to individual, disadvantaged students gives schools an incentive to attract and retain such students (and the funding that goes with them). This will encourage schools to compete to come up with the best ways to serve disadvantaged students, leading to more innovation and better educational outcomes. Furthermore, this would facilitate the national trend toward families being able to choose the schools their children attend because the child would bring the funding with him. Second, principals should be given both the professional freedom and the incentive to raise low-income students’ achievement. Currently, restrictions like supplement-not-supplant attempt to tightly control principals’ and districts’ use of Title I funds, with significant administrative burdens of management and enforcement. Instead of managing the process by which funding is used, principals could be given greater freedom in how they use that funding, in return for delivering higher achievement scores among the targeted student population. When school principals have greater autonomy over how Title I funds are spent, they can use innovative and flexible approaches that serve their particular students’ needs, allowing them to more fully perform the role of school leader. The flip-side of greater financial autonomy is that principals should be more directly held accountable for student outcomes. Judging a principal by students’ academic outcomes assigns responsibility where it is due, and greater autonomy over use of funding to achieve those outcomes confers the authority to foster those achievements. This decentralized approach promotes better results than a one-size-fits-all model. Findings from Reason Foundation’s 2013 edition of the Weighted Student Formula Yearbook suggest that in school districts that use a portable school funding framework to finance schools, more school-level autonomy over school budgets leads to faster improvement in student achievement and a greater likelihood of closing achievement gaps.**

**Student-focus key to help low-income students.**

**Russell 15 (Jason, "Portable education funding would help impoverished students," Washington Examiner, 2/6/15, http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/portable-education-funding-would-help-impoverished-students/article/2559936)**

**A new Center for American Progress report on portable federal funding for low-income students misses the mark on the issue of school choice. According to the report, if students living in poverty can choose to take their federal funding to a better school district, low-income districts might lose some money. The point of portable funding *isn’t for districts* to get money*, it’s to help students* get a better education. As the report says, “the challenges that low-income students face are significantly greater when the majority of their classmates are also low income.” But portable funding helps impoverished students move into better-performing schools without badly hurting those who remain. “If anything, the CAP report is an argument to double-down on portability,” Lisa Snell, the director of education and child welfare at the Reason Foundation, told the Washington Examiner. “If they really want equity for kids, they shouldn’t be looking at the money following kids into districts, they should *look at where the kids land*.” Portable education funding is up for debate as education committee leaders in Congress look to fix No Child Left Behind and reauthorize the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Under Title I of the act, four formulas distribute federal funds to high-poverty school districts. Snell explained that Title I funding is often distributed inequitably among the schools in a given district. Child poverty rates can vary significantly in larger school districts, and a given amount of funding may go toward the wealthy areas instead of poverty-stricken ones. Staffing is frequently determined by seniority, and older teachers who command higher salaries often prefer wealthy schools to impoverished ones. “If you could make [Title I funding] portable, weight it based on where the kids actually land and their concentrations of poverty and do it at the school level, you would actually take care of all the objections that CAP has, you would make it much more equitable, and you would actually *solve for the inequity* that’s actually caused by different levels of teacher experience or staffing, because that’s really where these huge inequities come in,” Snell said. If low-income school districts end up losing federal money on portability, it won’t be much. The report notes that school districts with a child poverty rate above 30 percent average $12,509 in total revenue per pupil. By the authors’ estimates, these schools would lose $86 per student on average, or less than one percent of funding. Giving students trapped in failing schools an opportunity for better education is well worth *0.7 percent of funding.***

**States CP Solvency**

**States Solve Finance**

**State action solves better – localized to community concerns.**

**Greenspahn 8 [Daniel Greenspahn (J.D. of The George Washington University of Law, research officer for the Institute of International Education), “THE ROBERTS COURT AND EQUAL PROTECTION: GENDER, RACE, AND CLASS: RACE: A Constitutional Right to Learn: The Uncertain Allure of Making a Federal Case out of Education,” 59 S.C. L. Rev. 755]**

**D. Success of State School Funding Litigation As a counterpoint to the risks of returning to federal court, there are benefits of continuing to litigate school funding cases at the state level. State constitutions, unlike the federal Constitution, explicitly recognize the right to an education. n242 As [\*780] a result, courts have been more willing to hold states accountable in providing the resources necessary to meet state-imposed educational standards. n243 State litigation, by most accounts, has been relatively successful, with plaintiff victories in twenty-eight states. n244 Elected officials, following state court orders, have increased spending by 11% on schools in the poorest districts and by 7% in median districts. n245 Increased funding for the neediest districts has increased student proficiency in states such as Kentucky and Massachusetts and improved school facilities in others, such as Arizona. n246 Furthermore, studies prompt-ed by litigation in more than thirty states have resulted in revisions to school funding formulas so that educational re-sources are delivered based on actual student need. n247 At the remedial stage, state-generated solutions also make it easier to tailor reforms to various educational short-comings and local political realities than would be possible at the national level. n248 Correcting sharp divides between New York City schools and its suburban counterparts, for example, raises very different challenges than does fixing the educational inadequacies facing rural communities in sparsely populated Alaska. n249 Furthermore, judicial activism at the state level is viewed as more tolerable because state judges, often elected, are accountable to state residents, and the citizens of the states can more easily amend their state constitutions in response to judicial decisions they believe are faulty. n250 As a result, decisions of state courts tend to enjoy more legitimacy and are more likely to reflect community concerns than those of life-tenured federal judges often perceived as distant. In the last three decades, state-level litigation has made important contributions in the field of school funding. Such litigation has documented the failures of unnecessarily complex state funding formulas that distribute resources based on [\*781] political motivations rather than student need. n251 State litigation has spurred the development of innovative legal strategies, such as the shift from equity to adequacy, as well as the development of basic school funding principles, including transparency, predictability, and accountability. n252 By coupling accountability and adequacy, state lawsuits have united liberals and conservatives, and "linked higher standards ... to increased resources." n253 In addition, state liti-gation has produced judicially manageable standards, n254 and has brought courts and legislatures together in fixing school funding inadequacies. n255 State litigation is not a perfect solution to educational inadequacies, n256 but it has been an effective tool that is preferable to the uncertainties of seeking redress in federal court. E. Local Control over Education Local control over education remains a reality and a touchstone of accountable government that weighs against a feder-al right to education. Federal participation in education has increased in recent years, n257 but decisions regarding curricu-lum, personnel, and school administration are overwhelmingly made at the community level. n258 The American tradition of decentralized education is viewed as "more responsive ... [and] democratic" than an educational system controlled by a distant federal government. n259 A policy of allowing wide-ranging local reforms encourages states, as individual labor-atories, to work toward educational success. n260 State and local governments also provide funding for over 90% of public school expenditures. n261 Brown I's famous proclamation that "education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments" n262 still reflects modern [\*782] practice. Even if NCLB has imposed federal requirements in the area of education, no single expendi-ture receives more state and local support than public schools. n263 There is a certain logic in having state litigation alleg-ing resource deficiencies track state expenditures, the primary source of funding for education. Despite growing "federal involvement in education, the tradition of local-state governance has prevailed over efforts to equalize education re-sources across state lines through litigation or legislation." n264 The Supreme Court has been a chief defender of local control. The year following Rodriguez, the Court declared that "no single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools." n265 Ever since, the Court has reiterated the value of local control in decisions involving school desegregation, n266 education funding, n267 student assignment, n268 and student speech. n269 The Court has praised local control because it "affords citi-zens an opportunity to participate in decisionmaking, permits the structuring of school programs to fit local needs, and encourages "experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence.'" n270 The prominence of community decisionmaking in schooling and the Supreme Court's commitment to this policy weigh heavily against pur-suit of a federal right to education.**

**DA Links**

**Winners Win Link**

**Education reform has bipartisan popularity**

**Elizabeth Debray 13, Professor, Department of Lifelong Education, Administration, and Policy (Educational Administration and Policy)Future Policy Directions for Congress in Ensuring Equality of Opportunity: Toward Improved Incentives, Targeting, and Enforcement, Taylor & Francis, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0161956X.2013.752627**

**Despite a history of disagreement between the Democrats and Republicans over the appropriate level of federal control in education—including strong opposition to many categorical programs from the Nixon, Ford, and Reagan administrations—the parties were able to engage in bipartisan negotiations over education reform from the 1970s through the 1990s. The positions of both parties moved toward the center on educational reform, meeting in the middle at standards and accountability. This spirit of negotiation and federal activism led to a rather seamless passage of NCLB, the 2001 reauthorization of the ESEA. Many conservative Republicans violated their core ideologies to support the bill—that is, voted for NCLB despite its expansion of control over the affairs of local schools**

**The parties have become more ideologically cohesive in the area of education policy as both Democrats and Republicans have moved away from their traditional values. The Democratic Party, as its membership became more centrist, moved away from more traditional “equity” policies toward a more general governance of student achievement, specifically via testing and accountability. Similarly, Republicans’ values have been challenged by what might be called a “federalist dilemma” (Kincaid, 2001, p. 32): to pursue federal educational reform, Republicans have had to abandon in part their traditional ideological principles of local control and small federal government. With regards to education policy, Congress is stronger than ever because the two parties have been working towarThe parties have become more ideologically cohesive in the area of education policy as both**

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**Spending Links**

**A federal foundation would cost $30 billion more than the amount spent on Title I in the status quo - which state school districts could use to partially replace their normal cost of operations.**

**Pasachoff 2008 (Eloise. *How the Federal Government Can Improve School Financing Systems*. Brookings Institution, Center on Children and Families, 2008. Pp. 32-33)**

**Applying these parameters to data from the 2002-2003 school year, Liu estimates that the program would have reduced interstate inequality by 32 percent and would have cost $43.5 billion, about $30 billion more than is currently spent under Title I. Removing the 4 percent minimum matching rate would have reduced interstate inequality even more (by 37 percent) and would have cost less (only $37.2 billion), although only thirty states would have benefited from the program.348 Strikingly, Liu notes that actual federal education revenue during this time period was $36.8 billion and yet narrowed interstate inequity by only 12 percent.349 Such a program would be an ambitious move, representing a large influx of federal money in a new and complicated financing scheme. Yet especially given the vast reach of substantive and structural requirements on the states under NCLB, a program to provide more federal funds is eminently reasonable. One that addresses the inequalities in education funding among states and accounts for variations in state-level resources is even more sensible. Implementing a federal foundation program, however, would be controversial. One major concern is that states would substitute federal resources for their own resources, thereby leaving actual education spending unchanged. There is some evidence that, under the current system, such offsets do take place over time.350 This concern militates towards a strengthened maintenance-of-effort provision, limiting the ability of states and districts to game the system. For example, the current maintenance-of-effort provision requires states and districts to maintain at least 90 percent of their funding from year to year, meaning that up to 10 percent of state and local resources can be cut without running afoul of the law. Increasing the required percentage well above 90 percent would help alleviate this concern.**

**In order to be effective – the government would have to increase Title I funding 8 fold. This means the cost of spending roughly $112 billion dollars.**

**Russell 15 (Jason Russell is the contributors editor for the Washington Examiner. Previously, he was a researcher for Economics21 at the Manhattan Institute, “Study: Feds wasting billions in education spending”,** [**http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/study-feds-wasting-billions-in-education-spending/article/2576854**](http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/study-feds-wasting-billions-in-education-spending/article/2576854)**, LD)**

**The federal government spends $14 billion a year boosting funding for schools with low-income families, but most of that taxpayer funding is wasted, a new paper says. For 60 years, that funding has come from Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, known in its current form as No Child Left Behind. The funding averages roughly $500 to $600 per student per year. Nationwide, the average amount spent per public school student is $12,000, so the funding bump from Title I is fairly small. That bump pays for only 10 hours of teaching a year for a student. To be effective, the federal government either needs to spend more on the program or ensure the money is going toward effective uses, according to the paper, authored by the Brookings Institution's Mark Dynarski and Kirsten Kainz "There is little evidence that the overall program is effective or that its funds are used for effective services and activities," Dynarski and Kainz write. "Large proportions of school principals report using Title I funds for teacher professional development, which many studies have shown to be ineffective and which teachers do not find valuable. Other services on which principals spent Title I funds include after-school and summer programs, technology purchases, and supplemental services, which also have been shown to be ineffective, and class-size reductions, which are unlikely to be of the size needed to generate effects found in previous research.". More than four in five principals who get Title I funding spent at least some of the funds on professional development. But there is no evidence professional development programs are effective, according to an** [**August 2015 report**](http://tntp.org/publications/view/the-mirage-confronting-the-truth-about-our-quest-for-teacher-development) **from the New Teacher Project. The Institute of Education Sciences, an arm of the Department of Education, also found no evidence that professional development improves student learning. What hurts Title I's effectiveness is how widely spread the funding is, Dynarski and Kainz say. If the funds were targeted toward fewer students or services with proven effectiveness, the funding might work better. With the number of students it currently targets, the federal government would have to increase Title I funding by up to eight times as much as it spends now to be effective.**